Military war and information warfare

What lessons can we draw from unexpected scenarios in the complex relationship between military and information warfare?

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What about the concept of “informational defeat”?

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The withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan is not limited to the failure of the pro-Western regime based in Kabul after the offensive launched in 2001, but is also an emblematic case of strategic and informational failure, whose strategic dimension deserves to be understood.

Such lucidity existed after the September 11 attacks, with an effort to introspect on the mistakes in sharing intelligence between the CIA and the FBI, already illustrating the structural flaws in the management of strategic information and intelligence. But this effort has not been replicated regarding the shortcomings in the information war against the Taliban.

The lack of in-depth analysis on the limits of “information warfare” questions the ability of the American system to draw strategic lessons from its past defeats. Colonial wars have shown that tactical victories in communication can be won without winning strategically, as long as the occupier is perceived as an invader.

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A military force presented as liberating but perceived as an occupying power

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In Afghanistan, American forces wanted to embody Western moral values. But this posture has come up against local traditions, especially in rural areas. The corruption of the pro-Western regime has finished discrediting this posture.

This refusal to face reality has changed the very perception of information warfare in the West. The defeat against the Taliban has undermined the confidence of many officers, especially in France, in American information warfare strategies.

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A forgotten doctrine: the legacy of Galula

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However, General Petraeus had sought to draw inspiration from the approach of David Galula, a French officer specializing in counterinsurgency, particularly in terms of information. But the West did not delve deeper into the notion of “informational defeat.”

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An insufficient response: cyber and disinformation

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Faced with the complexity of information struggles, NATO has refocused on cybersecurity and the detection of fake news. However, in the case of Afghanistan, these dimensions played a marginal role.

The United States was unable to identify the informational center of gravity to counter the Taliban. Could they only be destabilized, as they were based on ancient ethnic rivalries and structural imbalances in the region? Nothing is less certain.

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The need for strategic memory

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The Afghan case shows the limits of military force in the face of an asymmetric war with contradictory challenges: ethnic divisions, Pakistan's double-dealing, drug economy, corruption. The democratic argument was not adapted to local cultural realities.

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Mistakes already seen in Vietnam

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During the Vietnam War, the United States already failed to understand the opposing center of gravity: not the enemy army, but American public opinion.

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“Communist leaders have bet on winning the information war, targeting American opinion rather than military battles.”

— General Robert Scale, US Army War College

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Revenge through information: the Polish example

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It was in the opposing camp that the United States found a new lever: support for Solidarnosc in Poland in 1980. This social uprising undermined the legitimacy of the regime supported by the USSR.

This precedent demonstrates the power of the offensive use of information to undermine authoritarian power. It announces the “color revolutions” of the years 2000-2012.

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NATO is taking action on the paradigm shift

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A 2014 study published by NATO's StratCom highlights the research of informational superiority, beyond military dominance. The conflict is moving from the physical field to the conquest of minds.

The Russians will be inspired by it to prepare for the annexation of Crimea.

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The limits of thinking focused on military war

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The Russian invasion of 2022 restored military warfare to a central role, relegating information warfare to the background.

But the failure of the conquest of Kiev, and then of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, led to a dead end. Negotiation is becoming inevitable, and with it, the return of the information war.

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Military conflicts without a lasting resolution

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In the Middle East, Israel's wars against Hamas or Hezbollah also show the limits of military victory. The October 7, 2023 raid temporarily united Israeli society. But even after the military successes of the IDF, future information wars are inevitable.

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The African example: the information war against France

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In sub-Saharan Africa, Operation Serval (2013) was initially perceived as a success. But Operation Barkhane (2014—2022) did not make it possible to sustainably stabilize the region or to avoid the gradual rejection of the French presence.

The information war waged by Russia against France in this region, although not decisive, revealed the French inability to respond effectively.

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A French approach that is still too defensive

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Marked by Algeria, French thinking about information warfare remains cautious, defensive, even paralyzed. By imposing its reading through cybersecurity and the fight against fake news, NATO has reinforced this posture.

But this approach is no longer enough. It is necessary to analyze how The adversary Occupy the land Through a use offensive information.

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The taboo of the “offensive” is crumbling

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Gradually, an awareness is emerging. The idea that Our enemies have no limits in the use of information is essential.

Preparing for high military intensity is necessary, but should not distract from the fact that information warfare is taking place at a different pace.

To refrain from answering it is not to conduct it.

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Conclusion: getting out of passivity

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By refusing combat or by waging a partial war (hacking, law, cyber), France is exposed to receiving beatings without fighting back.

The clocks in military warfare and those in information warfare are out of sync. That is the whole problem.

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Tribune by Christian Harbulot.

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Illustration

Image generated by AI, portrait of Christian Harbulot.

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sourcing

[1] Director of the School of Economic Warfare (EGE), CR451

[2] Antoine Mariotti, The agency, secret CIA stories, Taillandier, 2024

[3] FLN poisoning operation in Algeria

[4] Art — Vietnam, the betrayal of the media, octobre 2008

[5] OTAN, Stratcom, 2014 – stratcomcoe.org

[6] Christian Harbulot, Fabricants d’intox, Lemieux éditeur, 2016

[7] Étude CRIMÉE – ege.fr

[8] Marc-Antoine Brillant, Viginum, conférence du 17 octobre 2024